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FEATURE COMMENT: Withdrawing The 
U.S. From The WTO GPA: Assessing 
Potential Damage To The U.S. And Its 
Contracting Community
The Trump Administration is mulling an execu-
tive order that would trigger U.S. withdrawal from 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement 
on Government Procurement (GPA), according 
to reports from Bloomberg and POLITICO. E.g., 
Trump Considers Withdrawing From WTO’s $1.7 
Trillion Purchasing Pact, Bloomberg, Feb. 4, 2020, 
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-04/
trump-mulls-withdrawal-from-wto-s-1-7-trillion-
purchasing-pact. Withdrawal from the GPA would 
deprive U.S. suppliers of a key point of access to 
public procurement markets internationally, un-
der a world-wide agreement that has set global 
standards and opened over a trillion dollars an-
nually in business opportunities. See, e.g., Robert 
D. Anderson et al., “Assessing the Value of Future 
Accessions to the WTO Agreement on Government 
Procurement (GPA): Some New Data Sources, Pro-
visional Estimates, and An Evaluative Framework 
for Individual WTO Members Considering Acces-
sion,” 2012 Pub. Proc. Law Rev. 113, www.wto.org/
english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201115_e.pdf. The U.S. 
could forfeit access to important public procurement 
markets in Canada and many other countries, and 
the U.S. could lose its leadership role (which dates 
back to World War II) in shaping global standards 
in public procurement, even as more countries are 
joining the GPA.
The GPA: an Essential Foundation for 
Efficient Government Contracting World-
wide—The WTO’s GPA is the world’s premier tool 
for establishing and enforcing open markets for 
government contracting internationally. The GPA 
has three main elements: (1) binding guarantees 
of non-discriminatory treatment in covered public 
procurements run by the 48 WTO member govern-
ments covered by the GPA (including the European 
Union, Canada, Israel and many other industrial-
ized and developing nations); (2) important trans-
parency and procedural requirements that ensure 
U.S. and other offshore suppliers have access to 
the information necessary to compete fairly; and 
(3) a guarantee that all participating countries will 
have in place effective domestic review (bid pro-
test) procedures to adjudicate supplier complaints. 
Estimates vary, but the GPA is generally thought 
to cover about $1.7 trillion in public procurements, 
world-wide. See, e.g., Robert D. Anderson & Nadez-
dha Sporysheva, “The Revised WTO Agreement on 
Government Procurement: Evolving Global Foot-
print, Economic Impact and Policy Significance,” 
2019 Pub. Proc. Law Rev. 71 (available on Westlaw).
The U.S. originally proposed an international 
agreement to open world public procurement mar-
kets in the months after World War II, and versions 
of the GPA have been in place since 1979, all pre-
pared with extensive U.S. involvement during both 
Republican and Democratic administrations. In fact, 
it is safe to say that the GPA would not exist without 
U.S. leadership. The current version was adopted in 
2012, and embodies modernized procedural require-
ments, improved market access commitments and, 
significantly, pathbreaking anti-corruption require-
ments that were strongly supported by the U.S. 
E.g.,  Anderson, Schooner & Swan, Feature Com-
ment: “The WTO’s Revised Government Procure-
ment Agreement—An Important Milestone Toward 
Greater Market Access And Transparency in Global 
Public Procurement Markets,” 54 GC ¶ 1.
The GPA Is Becoming More Important 
Over Time—Currently, 48 WTO member jurisdic-
tions are covered by the GPA. Other major econo-
mies, including China and the Russian Federation, 
are bidding to join the GPA, which will require 
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them to open their public procurement markets 
on fair and competitive terms. India is an observer 
(typically the first step to joining the GPA), and many 
other developing nations have entered the accession 
process. Brazil announced last month that it intends 
to join the GPA, as part of a broader effort to check 
corruption and join international markets. E.g., “Bra-
zil Announces It Will Adhere to the International 
Agreement on Government Procurement,” Nat. Law 
Rev., Jan. 23, 2020, www.natlawreview.com/article/
brazil-announces-it-will-adhere-to-international-
agreement-government-procurement. 
The United Kingdom, for its part, has made clear 
its firm determination to continue to be bound by and 
enjoy the benefits of GPA participation following its 
exit from the EU. See WTO, “UK set to become a party 
to the Government Procurement Agreement in its own 
right,” Feb. 27, 2019, www.wto.org/english/news_e/
news19_e/gpro_27feb19_e.htm. This is not surprising, 
given the extent to which contractors (from the UK 
and elsewhere) rely on the GPA’s assurances of fair 
treatment and access in a rapidly globalizing public 
procurement market.
For the U.S. supplier community, it is important to 
understand that as an existing party to the GPA, by 
the terms of the GPA the U.S. is entitled to block the 
admission of new parties to the GPA (such as China 
and Russia) unless the U.S. is satisfied with the new 
parties’ offers of market access and reforms to their 
national procurement systems. Furthermore, in our 
experience, the U.S. exercises its influence and nego-
tiating heft adroitly and without hesitation to protect 
the interests of U.S. suppliers. See, e.g., Christopher 
Yukins & Johannes Schnitzer, “GPA Accession: Lessons 
Learned on the Strengths and Weaknesses of the WTO 
Government Procurement Agreement,” 7 Trade Law & 
Dev. J. 89 (2015). The U.S. will also have a seat at the 
table and well-established position of influence when, 
as is inevitable, the GPA is revised and renegotiated. 
The U.S. will, however, lose all of this critical negotiat-
ing leverage if in fact it withdraws from the GPA.
Misconceptions Regarding the Balance of 
U.S. Interests in the GPA—Some critics’ views of 
the GPA have been informed, at least in part, by a 
misunderstanding of the opportunities available to 
U.S. suppliers under the GPA. A 2017 report by the 
Government Accountability Office concluded that the 
U.S. had opened access to about $837 billion worth 
of its procurement contracts annually, whereas the 
next five largest GPA parties—the EU, Japan, South 
Korea, Norway and Canada—had provided access to 
only about $381 billion worth of procurements. See 
United States Reported Opening More Opportunities 
to Foreign Firms Than Other Countries, but Better 
Data Are Needed (GAO-17-168), available at www.
gao.gov/assets/690/682663.pdf. GAO acknowledged, 
though, that the available data were incomplete, and 
the report missed important structural advantages 
that the U.S. enjoys under the GPA.
Unlike the member states of the EU, which pro-
vide comprehensive access to national, provincial 
and local markets, only 37 of the 50 U.S. states have 
opened (and only partially opened) their markets un-
der the GPA. The U.S. also excludes federally funded 
mass transit and highway projects and almost all mu-
nicipalities from the GPA, and excludes the extensive 
preferences (including small business preferences) 
which may cover roughly a quarter of the federal pro-
curement market. The EU, which favors open markets 
as a matter of principle, affords much broader coverage 
to sub-central and public utility procurements. 
Other reports by GAO and the European Com-
mission have pointed out that the true level of foreign 
penetration in the U.S. and EU markets is relatively 
low. This may well be due to de facto local preferences 
(“home bias”) in public purchasing. This argues for 
reinforcing, rather than abandoning, market-opening 
measures under the GPA, if U.S. suppliers hope to 
broaden their access to foreign markets. 
The GAO report did not address specifically the 
matter of access to Canadian public procurement 
markets, which has recently emerged as a poten-
tially serious issue were the U.S. to abandon the GPA. 
Canada added an estimated $100 billion to its GPA 
commitments in the course of the renegotiation that 
culminated in 2012, see Robert D. Anderson, “The 
Conclusion of the Renegotiation of the WTO Agree-
ment on Government Procurement: What it Means 
for the Agreement and for the World Economy,” 2012 
Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 83—a renegotiation in which the 
U.S. itself gave up relatively little in the way of new 
market-opening commitments. This important access 
to Canadian procurement markets could be forfeited if 
the U.S. abandoned the GPA, because Canada refused 
to open its public procurement markets under the new 
U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). 
As Jean Heilman Grier, the former lead negotiator 
on government procurement for the Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative, noted with regard to U.S. reli-
ance on the GPA to access Canadian public markets:
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When the [USMCA] is implemented, it will termi-
nate the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), which gives [U.S. suppliers] rights to 
participate in Canada’s federal procurement mar-
ket. By contrast, the USMCA excluded Canada 
from its procurement obligations. The admin-
istration, however, assured U.S. suppliers that 
they would continue to have access to Canadian 
procurement under the GPA.
Jean Heilman Grier, “Consequences of Potential U.S. 
Withdrawal from GPA,” trade.djaghe.com/?p=6244. 
Withdrawal from the GPA thus would deprive U.S. 
suppliers of hard-won rights to participate in Ca-
nadian government procurements, rights that were 
enjoyed for years under NAFTA and were supposed 
to survive the transition to the USMCA, based on 
Canada’s separate commitments in the GPA and the 
assumption that the U.S. would remain in the GPA. 
See, e.g., Christopher R. Yukins, “The United States in 
International Procurement: Understanding a Pause 
in the Trump Administration’s Protectionism,” 2019 
Gov. Contr. Year in  Rev. Br. 6 (Feb. 2019), papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3439736.
Another problem with the GAO report at the 
center of the current debate, as Grier notes, is that 
the GAO report suggests that “the value of procure-
ment agreements should be determined by the size 
of covered procurement, as opposed to whether the 
parties are offering comparable coverage in terms of 
the entities, goods and services subject to the agree-
ments.” Jean Heilman Grier, “GAO Procurement 
Report: Valid Criticisms, Questionable Comparison,” 
trade.djaghe.com/?p=3820. This approach to trade 
agreements—sometimes called “dollar-for-dollar reci-
procity”—ignores the huge size disparities between 
procurement markets, the practical impossibility of 
opening markets on a rigidly reciprocal basis, and the 
collateral diplomatic and economic benefits of a shift 
to open trade (discussed below). 
The 2017 GAO report further overlooked the fact 
that, currently, among the GPA parties, only the U.S. 
has in place effective enforcement machinery—under 
the Trade Agreements Act—to exclude and penalize 
suppliers from non-GPA parties. In the EU and at 
least some other GPA parties, in contrast, bids from 
suppliers that are not strictly entitled to participate 
often “slip through the cracks.” That may change, 
however, if the U.S. abandons the GPA. The EU has 
been considering similar enforcement mechanisms for 
years, see, e.g., European Parliament, “A New EU In-




Heilman Grier, “EU: New Push for Measure to Open 
Procurement,” trade.djaghe.com/?p=5628. In the 
event of an abrupt U.S. withdrawal from the GPA, 
the EU would be much more likely to put in place 
enforcement measures to exclude U.S. suppliers from 
EU procurements. See generally Jean Heilman Grier, 
“Consequences of Potential U.S. Withdrawal from 
GPA,” trade.djaghe.com/?p=6244.
Even more importantly, the GAO report never con-
sidered the new business opportunities for U.S. sup-
pliers that will accrue when China, Russia, Brazil and 
other emerging economies complete their accessions to 
the GPA. These have been previously (and, in our view, 
conservatively) estimated by the WTO Secretariat to 
be valued at perhaps $500 billion annually. See Robert 
D. Anderson et al., “Assessing the Value of Future Ac-
cessions,” supra. For example, while details of China’s 
eventual market access commitments are still under 
negotiation, at a minimum they will include (in addi-
tion to very significant central government purchases) 
procurements by multiple cities larger than 10 mil-
lion persons and by numerous major state-owned 
enterprises. See, e.g., Jean Heilman Grier, “China’s 
New GPA Offer: Enhances Accession Prospects” (Nov. 
7, 2019), trade.djaghe.com/?p=6073; Skye Mathie-
son, “Note: Accessing China’s Public Procurement Mar-
ket: Which State-Influenced Enterprises Should the 
WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement Cover?,” 
40 Pub. Cont. L.J. 233 (2010). The opportunities avail-
able to U.S. suppliers will, moreover, grow over time if 
the rapid growth of the Chinese economy continues.
Cutting-edge economic research further illumi-
nates the economic benefits accruing from the GPA. 
Such research emphasizes that the welfare gains for 
participating states from the liberalization of public 
procurement markets go beyond narrow market 
access considerations and include broader benefits, 
such as strengthened competition, the availability 
of new technologies, and better value for money in 
procurement markets. For a review of this emerging 
literature, see Zornitsa Kutlina-Dimitrova, “Can We 
Put a Price on Extending the Scope of the GPA? A 
First Quantitative Assessment,” EU Commission, 
DG Trade, Chief Economist Note, Issue 1 (Mar. 2017), 
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/march/tra-
doc_155456.pdf. 
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Another important benefit of the GPA is that, 
because the GPA requires the parties’ consensus to 
change, it plays a key role in checking policy “back-
sliding”—the weakening of commitments to open 
markets and the introduction of new restrictive 
measures in times of economic crisis and/or political 
exigency. See Bernard Hoekman, “Reducing Home Bias 
in Public Procurement: Trade Agreements and Good 
Governance,” 24 Global Governance 249 (2018). By 
constraining sharp swings in protectionism, the GPA 
reduces risks for governments (and firms) that invest 
in efficient cross-border supply chains.
The GAO report also did not address how U.S. 
withdrawal from the GPA would disrupt the lattice-
work of global free trade agreements. The government 
procurement chapters of U.S. regional and bilateral 
free trade agreements—which provide important 
market access to U.S. suppliers—are typically mod-
elled directly on the GPA. Abandoning the GPA would 
encourage a proliferation of different models and 
approaches, which would create costly uncertainty 
for suppliers. See, e.g., Robert D. Anderson, Anna 
Caroline Müller & Philippe Pelletier, “Regional Trade 
Agreements and Procurement Rules: Facilitators or 
Hindrances?,” in A. Georgopoulos, B. Hoekman & P. 
Mavroidis (eds.), The Internationalization of Govern-
ment Procurement Regulation 55 (Oxford Univ. Press, 
2016), papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2707219. 
Additional Practical Implications for U.S. 
Contractors if the U.S. Abandons the GPA—
Abandoning the GPA could carry additional serious—
and potentially costly—implications at home for U.S. 
contractors, if the U.S. finds itself locked in years of 
bilateral negotiations to replace the GPA:
•	 Suppliers	 in	 the	 federal	market	are	 likely	 to	
shift aggressively towards the commercial 
“electronic marketplaces” that the General 
Services Administration plans to open soon, 
under a pending “pilot” procurement. See 
Christopher R. Yukins, Feature Comment, “U.S. 
Government To Award Billions Of Dollars In 
Contracts To Open Electronic Marketplaces 
To Government Customers—Though Serious 
Questions Remain,” 61 GC ¶ 303. Users will 
be able to make micro-purchases directly from 
online marketplaces (Amazon is the leading 
commercial example). Those micro-purchases 
would be exempt from the Buy American Act. 
Because many more federal procurements will 
become subject to the Buy American Act if the 
U.S. withdraws from the GPA, and the Trump 
Administration is simultaneously increasing 
price preferences under the Act, see Christo-
pher R. Yukins, Feature Comment, “Trump Ex-
ecutive Order Calls For More Aggressive Use 
Of The Buy American Act—An Order Likely To 
Have More Political Than Practical Effect,” 61 
GC ¶ 219, direct user purchases from the com-
ing “electronic marketplaces” may well soar. 
•	 Conversely,	 more	 traditional	 contracting	 ve-
hicles such as the GSA Multiple Award Sched-
ules, which rely on the Trade Agreements Act 
exemption for purchases under the GPA, could 
be thrown into chaos. Thousands of contracts 
across the Government may need to be re-
viewed and renegotiated (at a potential cost of 
billions of dollars) if the cornerstone to many 
Trade Agreements Act certifications—U.S. 
membership in the GPA—disappears.
•	 Withdrawing	 from	 the	 GPA	 also	 may	 cause	
years of costly reordering in contractors’ supply 
chains. If the U.S. moves to replace the GPA 
with bilateral trade agreements negotiated 
with other nations, U.S. suppliers may need to 
seek out alternative sources of supply in those 
nations—but during a period of high uncer-
tainty and flux, similar to the current tariff 
wars in U.S. commercial markets.
These are just some of the obvious potential im-
pacts of dropping out of the GPA. Less predictable 
indirect effects—such as possible retaliation against 
U.S. suppliers selling abroad—should also be consid-
ered and taken seriously.
The Broader Strategic Context: Would a 
GPA Withdrawal Undermine the Current Over-
whelming U.S. Advantage in Defense Procure-
ment?—Abandoning the GPA also could undermine 
the reciprocal defense procurement agreements 
between the U.S. and its allies, in Europe and else-
where—reciprocal agreements in defense goods and 
services which open markets around the world, and 
help support the substantial U.S. trade surplus in 
defense. Partially in response to Trump Administra-
tion initiatives, the EU has already launched the “Eu-
ropean Defence Fund,” which could shield European 
defense procurements from U.S. firms, in apparent 
violation of the standing reciprocal defense procure-
ment agreements. A U.S. move to abandon the GPA 
could trigger other retaliatory measures in defense, 
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in Europe and elsewhere, as allies respond in kind to 
U.S. protectionism—despite the security costs of clos-
ing what are, in fact, remarkably open defense mar-
kets under these reciprocal agreements. Withdrawing 
from the GPA thus could pitch the Department of 
Defense into years of efforts (like those currently un-
derway in response to the European Defence Fund) 
to reinforce these reciprocal agreements, which open 
defense markets to facilitate mutual cooperation and 
interoperability among U.S. allies. See, e.g., Christo-
pher R. Yukins, “How the Trump Administration May 
Reshape International Procurement Markets—De-
fense and Electronic Marketplaces,” Gov. Contr. Year 
in Rev. Br. (forthcoming Feb. 2020).
The Importance of U.S. Participation in the 
GPA for the Rules-based Multilateral Trading 
System—Ultimately, a U.S. withdrawal from the 
WTO GPA would carry with it risks for the sustain-
ability of the multilateral trading system as a whole. 
The system, which is already under significant strain, 
see, e.g., Jeffrey J. Schott & Euijin Jung, “The WTO’s 
Existential Crisis: How to Salvage Its Ability to Settle 
Trade Disputes,” Peterson Inst. Int’l Econs. (Dec. 
2019), www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/
pb19-19.pdf, depends on participating countries ac-
cepting the fundamental legitimacy of all of its parts, 
rather than opting out at will from particular agree-
ments or provisions that are deemed disadvantageous 
at a particular point in time. Having been put in place 
with over three-quarters of a century of strong U.S. 
support, the GPA is an integral part of that system. 
Given this, while it is impossible to foresee precisely 
how other WTO members would respond if the U.S. 
were to abandon its GPA commitments, they could 
well retaliate in material ways, potentially further 
disrupting international supply chains and fragment-
ing the global economy.
In sum, a U.S. withdrawal from the WTO GPA—as 
is apparently being mulled by at least some elements 
in the current administration—would entail very 
significant risks for the U.S., its suppliers and the in-
ternational trading system. It would, at a minimum, 
put at risk the market access opportunities that U.S. 
businesses currently enjoy under the GPA, arguably 
valued at over $1 trillion annually. It would deprive 
the U.S. of an essential tool to set global standards as 
procurement markets open internationally, notably in 
the cases of China, Russia, Brazil and other emerging 
economies expected to come into the GPA. It would 
undermine the viability of the GPA as a template for 
chapters on government procurement in regional and 
bilateral free trade agreements (something that both 
Republican and Democratic administrations have 
found useful) and thus could create further costs and 
uncertainties for industry. Withdrawing from the 
GPA could undermine U.S. free trade agreements in 
defense—an essential part of U.S. national security 
and strength in world defense markets—and would 
risk further weakening the already strained WTO 
system. For all these reasons, it is hoped that the U.S. 
can avoid the self-inflicted harms, direct and indirect, 
that withdrawing from the GPA would entail. 
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